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Catholicism, Job Security Regulations and Female Employment: A Micro-level Analysis of Esping-Andersen's Social Catholicism Thesis

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Abstract

This article explores the religious roots of job security regulations in Western democracies by putting Esping-Andersen's famous social Catholicism thesis to the test. Esping-Andersen argues that due to religious socialization, Catholics exhibit more conservative family values, i.e. they tend to support the male breadwinner model. To sustain this model of family organization, Catholics are expected to support job security regulations. These regulations have been described in the literature as important determinants of gender-segregated labour markets and low female employment rates. Data from this article show that while Catholics indeed support more conservative family models, so do Reformed Protestants and religious persons in general. Furthermore, no relationship between religious denomination and preferences for job security regulations can be observed. The analysis thus refutes Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis.

Keywords

Female employment; *Job security regulations*; *Catholicism*; *Male breadwinner model*; *Social Catholicism*

Introduction

More than ten years after the launch of the European Employment Strategy, with its deliberate goal of increasing the employment rate – especially for women – we can still observe significant cross-national differences in Western democracies. While the proportion of employed people overall among the population aged 15 to 64 is still below 60 per cent in Italy, the employment rate has reached nearly 80 per cent in Switzerland. Looking more closely at the data, it is apparent that most of the cross-national variation is due to differences in the employment rates of women (Kenworthy and Hicks 2008: 4–5). To compare Italy and Switzerland once more, 46.3

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per cent of Italian women aged 15 to 64 years are working, compared to 71.1 per cent in Switzerland. The employment rate of women is even higher in Canada and parts of Scandinavia (OECD 2007: 246–8). These impressive cross-national differences call for an explanation. However, despite a considerable amount of research on the determinants of employment rates, there is little agreement among researchers on what causes low female employment rates, as a review of the relevant literature shows (e.g. Nickell and Layard 1999; Saint-Paul 2004; Kenworthy 2008; Kenworthy and Hicks 2008).

In this article, I would like to contribute to the literature on the determinants of female employment rates by examining one of the most widely cited explanations for cross-national differences in female employment rates. In his seminal contribution on 'welfare states without work', Gøsta Esping-Andersen (1996) argues that, inspired by Catholic social teaching, social policies such as job security regulations are at the root of low employment rates in Continental Europe. Much more than Protestant social teaching, Catholic doctrine stresses family values and traditional forms of family organization, which are characterized by a working father and a caring mother (Schmidt 1993: 64–72; Esping-Andersen 1999: 81–3; Huber and Stephens 2000: 326). Building on this, Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999) argues that a strong relationship between Catholic political culture and a preference for job security regulations, here understood as restrictions on hiring and firing, can be expected. According to this view, job security regulations are the appropriate form of social protection in countries characterized by a Catholic political culture because they strengthen the male breadwinner model. By securing the labour market position of the male breadwinner, the whole family can be protected from unemployment and loss of income. However, these policies also increase the family's dependence on the male breadwinner, with negative consequences for the employment opportunities of women. With policies aimed at protecting male insiders, women are often relegated to non-standard employment or remain outside the labour force (Taylor-Gooby 1991; Esping-Andersen 2000; Rueda 2005; Emmenegger 2009a). The result of this process is a negative correlation between levels of job security regulations and female employment rates (Esping-Andersen 2000; OECD 2004).

Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis is one of the most widely cited explanations for low female employment rates. Unfortunately, he failed to put his innovative argument to the test; but the thesis has recently found empirical support in the work of Algan and Cahuc (2006, 2007). Algan and Cahuc show that predominantly more Catholics than Protestants agree with statements like 'When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women' or 'Family life suffers when women work'. Furthermore, they demonstrate that Catholics disproportionally support the statement: 'The government should support declining industries to protect jobs' and that the share of Catholics in a country is positively correlated with the level of job security regulations at the national level. Finally, they show that job security regulations are negatively correlated with female employment rates.

Thus, case closed? Not quite, as I argue in this article. There are some questionable assumptions in Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis and some shortcomings in Algan and Cahuc's study. Most notably, Esping-Andersen's (1996, 1999) thesis suffers from what Pierson (2004: 104) calls 'actor-centred functionalism'. These approaches work backwards from existing institutional arrangements to develop an account of how these institutions were rationally chosen. While this might be the case in some instances, it does not apply to the case of job security regulations, as I argue in the next section of this article. Moreover, as the replication of the study of Algan and Cahuc (2007) in the section on empirical evidence of this article shows, the empirical evidence does not support Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis once the sample is restricted to Christian countries, when Reformed and Lutheran Protestants are differentiated, or when the degree of religiosity is controlled.

By analysing the religious roots of job security regulations, this article echoes Max Weber's call to give religion centre stage in social science research. Weber argued that 'modern man is in general, even with the best will, unable to give religious ideas a significance for culture and national character which they deserve' (Weber 1930: 183, cited in Madeley 1983: 43). Recently, social scientists have brought religion back in (Madeley and Enyedi 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009). I am adding to this growing literature by looking at religious attitudes towards gender roles and preferences for job security regulations. Moreover, this article contributes to the emerging literature on the determinants of job security regulations (Botero *et al.* 2004; Algan and Cahuc 2006; Huo *et al.* 2008). Job security regulations have been identified as an important form of social protection by leading social policy scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1999), Bonoli (2003) and Kaufmann (2003). However, the literature on individual preferences in the area of regulatory social policies is still scant. Finally, this article is relevant for the literature on the determinants of female employment rates. Both Catholicism and job security regulations have been identified as impediments to high female employment (Schmidt 1993; Esping-Andersen 2000; OECD 2004; Feldmann 2007). However, there are still open questions with regard to causality. According to Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999, 2000), Catholic political culture is expected to lead to high levels of job security regulations, which, in turn, lead to low levels of female employment. Therefore, the effect of Catholicism on female employment is indirect. In contrast, Schmidt (1993) and Feldmann (2007) expect denomination to have a direct effect on female employment. Since Catholic political culture is not the source of a strong preference for job security regulations, as I show in the section on empirical evidence, below, the evidence presented lends more support to the causal mechanisms proposed by Schmidt (1993) and Feldmann (2007).

I begin this article by discussing the religious foundations of job security regulations and presenting a critique of Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis. Then the data sources for the micro-level analysis are documented. The results of the statistical analysis follow. A final section concludes and outlines implications for further research.

Religion and Job Security Regulations: The Social Catholicism Thesis

Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999) argues that Catholic political culture is the source of strict job security regulations. Catholic political culture exhibits a particular combination of value orientations. On the one hand, Catholics tend to be critical of unfettered market allocation and positive towards social policy intervention. On the other hand, Catholics are opposed to redistributive policies, centralization and state intervention. As a result, they support social measures that are executed by the lowest competent authority or by the church, a principle often referred to as subsidiarity. These value orientations lead to a particular set of social policies that highlight the role of regulatory policies such as labour law (Kaufmann 1988: 85). The positive role of labour law was even acknowledged by Pope Pius XI in his papal encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* in 1931. The Pope wrote that 'a new branch of law . . . has arisen . . . to protect vigorously the sacred rights of the workers that flow from their dignity as men and as Christians. These laws undertake the protection of . . . everything which pertains to the condition of wage workers, with special concern for women and children' (point 28).[1]

According to Esping-Andersen (1999: 23), job security regulations are characterized by an 'implicit familialism' that leads to a family's virtually complete dependence on the male breadwinner's income and entitlements. By targeting social policy interventions at the male breadwinner, the whole family can be reached. However, the consequence is that the whole family becomes dependent on the income of the male breadwinner. Thus, job security regulations institutionally strengthen traditional forms of family organization with a working husband and caring wife, and as a result, are supported by the Catholic Church.

It is important to note that, according to Esping-Andersen (1996: 66), this effect of Catholic political culture is not dependent on the level of religiosity or particular political parties. Rather, Catholic political culture provides the subjective orientation for all political actors independent of the level of religiosity, since its 'impact is transmitted mainly through nationwide institutions, to the population of a society as a whole, even to those who have little or no contact to religious institutions' (Inglehart and Baker 2000: 36). Thus, the Catholic political culture does not exert its influence exclusively through Christian democratic parties or other collective actors. Quite the contrary, it affects the preferences of *all* citizens. The cultural predominance of the male breadwinner model 'meant that [trade] unions came to battle for job security' (Esping-Andersen 1996: 75). Furthermore, 'even where Christian democratic parties were marginal, such as in France or Spain, Catholic social doctrines still exert a visible influence on social policy' (1996: 66).

In the following, I argue that the social Catholicism thesis suffers from 'actor-centred functionalism'. These approaches develop, on the basis of existing institutional arrangements and the preferences of contemporary political actors, an explanation of how these institutions were rationally chosen. As Pierson (2004: 104) writes: 'Focusing on the choices of individual and collective actors who select political institutions, [these approaches]

fashion explanations through reference to the benefits these actors expect to derive from particular institutional designs.' Similarly, Streeck (1997: 207) argues that 'rational actors may not always be the best judges of what is in their rational interest'. Policies and institutions may have unintended consequences, may turn out differently as conditions change or may unleash unpredicted creative capacity (1997: 210–12).

Esping-Andersen's thesis is clearly inspired by the persisting strong role of the male breadwinner model and the church, by the contemporary high levels of job security regulations and by the comparatively low female employment rates in Southern Europe (Ferrera *et al.* 2003: 361; OECD 2004: 117). But the argument overlooks the fact that a divergence in the use of socially protective job security regulations could be observed before family models other than the male breadwinner one emerged (Whiteside and Salais 1998; Bonoli 2003). 'Different paths were adopted as early as the end of the 19th century by countries that were equally characterized by the dominance of the male-breadwinner family model' (Bonoli 2003: 1015). The male breadwinner was the dominant form of family organization until the 1960s even in countries that are now very egalitarian, such as Sweden (Naumann 2005: 54). In this light, the social Catholicism thesis fails to explain why the predominance of the male breadwinner model led to the development of extensive job security regulations in some countries but not in others.[2]

While job security regulations may enforce the male breadwinner model today, it is doubtful whether policy-makers could have anticipated this development. Esping-Andersen's (1996, 1999) thesis not only implies that socially conservative voters and political actors were able to anticipate the consequences of job security regulations on family organization; it further implies that *only* socially conservative voters and political actors in *Catholic* countries had enough foresight to set up job security regulations to protect the male breadwinner model.

In fact, the influence of the Catholic Church has been very different across countries. Ireland is a case in point. Occupied by Great Britain until 1921, Ireland did not have the opportunity to develop policies and institutions consistent with Irish religious preferences (Crouch 1986: 187). Moreover, in countries like Ireland, and also Poland, the Church continues to be identified with an endangered nation, which leads to a comparatively strong collaboration between state and church (Stark and Iannaccone 1994: 243; Hamberg and Pettersson 1994: 208; Castles 1994: 37). These 'highly privileged churches do not put their money into fighting for particular policy positions that are traditionally dear to them' (Minkenberg 2002: 236–7). In contrast, in the Roman Catholic countries of Southern Europe, the Church became the rallying point for all forces alienated by modernization (Crouch 1993: 301–4). In these countries, the modernizing forces took an anti-Catholic, militantly liberal-secular form. As a result, the church–state relationship was much more confrontational. The Catholic Church opposed most public policy measures, including public social policies. This has led, according to Therborn (1994: 107), to the paradoxical situation whereby most of the modern social policy institutions have been designed by non-Catholic or a-Catholic forces, while

nowadays being strongly supported by Catholic political groups (see also Van Kersbergen and Manow 2009: 6).

A further weakness of Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis is its purely static perspective. It ignores the development of social norms such as the move from the male breadwinner model to a more egalitarian understanding of family organization in some countries. It also disregards the long-term changes due to secularization. How can religious social teachings affect somebody's policy preferences if she or he does not care about religion? Thus, the predominance of traditional forms of family organization in Southern Europe may not be due to Catholicism but to the level of religiosity. As Castles writes (1994: 30):

> the Catholic Church still seeks to uphold a distinct set of doctrines concerning the family, and those doctrines have traditionally included a belief that women's primary focus of activity should be in the home and not in the workplace. However, it is also true that the vast majority of Protestant denominations at one time emphasized a similar gender segregation, and that religiosity irrespective of denomination is frequently associated with traditional beliefs concerning the appropriate domestic division of labour. This being so, it would appear that any impact of the religious cleavage on labour market behaviour is likely, prima facie, to reflect a greater pace of secularization in the Protestant nations in the post-war period.

Indeed, Protestant ideas of social order seem to be equally conservative (Kaufmann 1988: 89; Bahle 2002: 395). Similarly, Haller and Höllinger (1994: 106) show that no significant differences by denomination can be detected within individual countries; however, they observe a strong relationship between religiosity and traditional gender role attitudes. The case of Sweden helps to clarify this point. Although Anderson (2009: 232) describes the (Protestant) Church of Sweden as very conservative, Sweden is not characterized by the predominance of the male breadwinner model. The reason for this seeming contradiction is simple. In 2001, only about 7 per cent of Swedish citizens attended religious services once a month or more, while the proportion of church-goers was five times higher in Italy and almost ten times higher in Ireland (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 74). Thus, the main difference may be one of religiosity rather than denomination.

Are the higher levels of religiosity in Catholic countries the result of Catholicism? The situation seems to be more complicated. Hence, predominantly Catholic France is relatively secularized, while the predominantly Protestant United States of America is more religious (Norris and Inglehart 2004: 85). As a consequence, Norris and Inglehart argue that the degree of religiosity in a nation state is not a function of predominant denominations but of economic development as such. Catholic countries may be more religious, but it is not clear whether being Catholic has anything to do with it, because Catholic countries also tend to be poorer.

Finally, the exclusive focus on Catholicism ignores differences in social policy preferences between non-Catholic denominations. Several authors

argue that a distinction should be made between Lutheran and Reformed Protestantism (Heidenheimer 1983; Kaufmann 1988; Manow 2002; Kahl 2005). By analysing poor relief traditions, Kahl (2009: 268) demonstrates that all three traditions have very different sets of moral values, especially concerning the tension between the principles of 'feeding one's poor brothers' and 'requiring paupers to work for their bread': 'Catholic countries . . . have been closest to the "feed the poor" postulate. Countries where Calvinism and the Reformed Protestant denominations that developed from Calvinism were historically politically dominant . . . have been closest to the work postulate. Lutheran countries . . . have sought to balance feeding the poor with a strong socialized obligation to work' (Kahl 2009: 268). Generally, Lutheran Protestants are described as being more open to state intervention. As argued by Sørensen (1998: 367): 'Luther placed the responsibility of replacing the relief provided by the Catholic Church upon the state.' In Scandinavia, for example, the Lutheran clergy are civil servants (Stark and Iannaccone 1994: 235). The strong state–church links made it easier to win public acceptance for public social policy measures (Heidenheimer 1983: 8). In contrast, Kahl (2009: 282) argues that the anti-statist position of Reformed Protestantism resembles Catholicism (see also Therborn 1994: 106; Bahle 2002: 395). Manow (2002: 221) and Heidenheimer (1983: 8) argue that Reformed Protestants are even more critical of public social policy interventions than Catholics.

Data and Method

Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis has recently found empirical support in the work of Algan and Cahuc (2006, 2007). In a first step, these authors show that Catholics are more supportive of the male breadwinner model by presenting evidence that Catholics disproportionally agree with statements like 'When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women' or 'Family life suffers when women work'. Subsequently, Algan and Cahuc (2006) show that proportionately more Catholics than non-Catholics tend to support the statement 'The government should support declining industries to protect jobs' and that the share of Catholics in a country is associated with a higher level of job security regulations at the national level. Finally, they show that job security regulations are negatively correlated with rates of female employment. In the subsequent replication of Algan and Cahuc's study, I focus on the first two links of the causal chain: (1) Are Catholics more supportive of the male breadwinner model than non-Catholics? (2) Are Catholics more supportive of job security regulations than non-Catholics? Due to space restrictions, I do not examine the relationship between the share of Catholics in a nation state and job security regulations, nor the relationship between job security regulations and female employment rates.[3]

In my replication of Algan and Cahuc's (2006) study, I introduce four important changes to the original model specification. First, I restrict the sample to predominantly Catholic and Protestant countries in order to increase the homogeneity of the sample and to respect the fact that Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999) does not offer any theoretical expectations for non-

Christian and Orthodox countries. This contrasts with Algan and Cahuc's test of Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis (2006), which included non-Christian countries such as Turkey and Japan, and Orthodox countries such as Greece in their analysis. Algan and Cahuc provide no theoretical arguments about the expected correlations, and they seem to ignore the fact that the relationship between religion and politics is often different in non-Christian countries (Kaufmann 1988; Hildebrandt 2002; Rieger and Leibfried 2004). The separation of religion and politics is not common in non-Christian countries. For instance, in Confucian countries like Japan, politics and religion tend to converge (Hildebrandt 2002: 456–7). Turkey, additionally, is much poorer than the other analysed countries. Having standardized the real GDP per capita of the United States at 100, Turkey reaches a value of 16.4 in 2004. Even Portugal, the poorest country covered by my analysis, has a GDP value three times higher than Turkey.[4] Greece, although Christian, is another problematic case. Esping-Andersen does not formulate any hypotheses for Orthodox countries. For Castles (1994: 24), there is no major difference between Catholic and Orthodox countries. But he is wrong, since 'Orthodoxy is rather the opposite of Catholicism: it is state-related rather than supranational; it is a liturgical church, rather weak on, or uninterested in, doctrine' (Therborn 1994: 103). As a consequence, I restrict my sample to 19 Western democracies that are either predominantly Catholic or Protestant.[5]

Second, the present analysis relies only on surveys from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). Algan and Cahuc (2006) employed both ISSP surveys and World Value Surveys. Considering the difficulties comparative attitude research faces (Jowell 1998; Kuechler 1998), a restriction to one source is a necessary step to increase the comparability of the surveys and increase the cross-national validity of indicators. I have opted for the International Social Survey Programme as it is designed to provide truly comparative data on attitudes and values (Svallfors 2006: 178).

The present analysis relies on three ISSP surveys. These surveys supply complementary information on religious denomination, religiosity, gender role perceptions and preferences for job security regulations. ISSP 1998 on religion enables us to study the denominational and religious roots of attitudes towards gender roles, while ISSP 1996 on the role of government and ISSP 1997 on work orientations provide the opportunity to analyse the determinants of preferences for job security regulations. Unfortunately, the countries included in these surveys were not always the same. However, restricting my sample to those ten countries that were included in all three surveys leads to the same results.[6] Restricting this enquiry to ISSP surveys has two further advantages. While Algan and Cahuc (2006) rely on surveys conducted in the years 1980, 1990, 1995, 1996 and 1998, the exclusive usage of ISSP surveys allows me to test all the theoretical implications of the social Catholicism thesis using surveys conducted in 1996, 1997 and 1998, thereby reducing problems of comparability over time. Moreover, this restriction makes it possible to use the same operationalization across all three datasets.[7]

Third, to improve the measurement of respondents' preferences for job security regulations, I have introduced a second dependent variable. So far, no survey has included questions directly addressing respondents' support for

regulatory protection against dismissals. Therefore, Algan and Cahuc (2006) rely on the following survey question from ISSP 1996 to operationalize preferences for job security regulations: 'Government should support declining industries or industries in difficulties to protect jobs.' However, this is a problematic operationalization. Although this question is very specific (Kangas 1997), it has the drawback of including aspects of industrial policy which may not necessarily be supported by the respondents. Hence, I use a second dependent variable: for ISSP 1997, respondents were asked the following question: 'How important do you personally think job security is in choosing a job?' This question is more general, but makes no reference to other policy fields. Admittedly, both operationalizations are far from optimal. Therefore, I present statistical models for both dependent variables in the subsequent parts. As the analysis in next section of this article shows, both operationalizations lead to similar conclusions. Hence, I can be reasonably sure that the evidence presented is robust.

Finally, I differentiate between Lutheran and Reformed Protestants in the subsequent statistical analysis. This distinction respects the different social policy preferences of the two other major Christian denominations in Western democracies (Heidenheimer 1983; Kaufmann 1988; Haller and Höllinger 1994; Manow 2002). Most notably, Reformed Protestants are described as being particularly critical of state intervention. Therefore, an amalgamation of Reformed and Lutheran Protestantism might hide essential differences and lead to wrong conclusions. Moreover, in some models, I further control for the level of religiosity.

In the following, I briefly discuss the operationalization of the variables. Respondents' gender role perceptions are measured using two survey questions from ISSP 1998: (1) 'How much do you agree or disagree: A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family' and (2) 'Agree or disagree: Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job.' Answers are coded from 1 ('strongly disagree') to 5 ('strongly agree'). Respondents' support for regulatory protection against dismissals has been operationalized using a survey question from each of ISSP 1996 and ISSP 1997. For ISSP 1996, respondents were asked whether they supported governmental action for declining industries to protect jobs. Respondents were offered five possible answers, ranging from 1 ('strongly against') to 5 ('strongly in favour'). For ISSP 1997, respondents were asked how important they considered job security to be when choosing a job. Respondents were offered five possible answers from 1 ('not important at all') to 5 ('very important'). To measure denomination, respondents were classified into four categories: Catholics, Lutheran Protestants, Reformed Protestants and respondents of no religious denomination. See table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed classification. Data on church attendance are used as a proxy for religiosity. This is a better indicator than religious beliefs 'because it ties religiosity to existing institutions instead of more abstract religious concepts and values' (Minkenberg 2002: 237). Furthermore, this operationalization enables the use of the same variable in all three datasets. The exact wording of the question is: 'How often do you attend religious services?' Respondents could choose between six different answers, ranging from 'never' to 'once a week or more'.[8]

Following Algan and Cahuc (2006), I include several control variables in the regression models. These variables are gender, age, education and income. See table A2 in the Appendix for detailed documentations of the operationalization and a summary of the statistics. To estimate the models, I follow Algan and Cahuc (2006) and use ordered probit regressions with country dummies and country clusters to adjust the standard errors for intra-group correlations.

Empirical Evidence

Table 1 displays the results of ordered probit regressions on the confessional determinants of gender role perceptions. Two different dependent variables have been used. In models 1 and 2, attitudes towards the statement 'A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and the family' are examined. In models 3 and 4, attitudes towards the statement 'Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job' are examined. Positive coefficients indicate an increased likelihood that respondents agree with the statement. Catholics have been used as a reference category.

Table 1 shows that Lutheran Protestants and people of no religious denomination tend to exhibit more progressive gender role perceptions than do Catholics. In the case of the statement 'A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and the family', the probability of strongly disagreeing increases by almost 10 per cent for Lutheran Protestants, and by more than 10 per cent for respondents of no denomination as opposed to Catholics. In the case of the statement 'Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job', the probability changes are slightly smaller (5 and 8 per cent). At the same time, no clear difference between Reformed Protestants and Catholics can be detected, indicating that a differentiation between Lutheran and Reformed Protestants is important for understanding the religious determinants of gender role perceptions.

Moreover, there is a strong discrepancy between religious and non-religious respondents independent of denomination, as the latter show less agreement with conservative statements regarding family organization. In fact, the integration of a variable measuring the level of religiosity leads to an impressive decrease in the significance of the dummy variables for Lutheran Protestants and respondents of no denomination. The z-value of the dummy variable for Lutheran Protestants decreases from 2.86 (model 1) to 1.99 (model 2) and from 4.21 (model 3) to 2.16 (model 4). Even more impressively, the z-value of the dummy variable for respondents of no denomination decreases from 11.93 (model 1) to 3.60 (model 2) and from 9.32 (model 3) to 4.03 (model 4). At the same time, the level of religiosity has a highly significant effect on gender role perceptions with z-values of 7.08 and 8.07. These results clearly show that the level of religiosity has a strong effect on gender role perceptions independent of denomination.[9]

If Esping-Andersen's (1996, 1999) argument that familialist attitudes drive the demand for job security regulations is correct, then Catholics, Reformed Protestants and religious persons in general can be expected to be more in favour of job security regulations. However, this is not the case, as table 2

Table 1

Religious determinants of gender role perceptions (ISSP 1998)

	A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and family		Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Catholic	Reference category			
Lutheran Protestant	−0.243**	−0.157*	−0.218***	−0.134*
	(2.86)	(1.99)	(4.21)	(2.16)
Reformed Protestant	0.034	0.053	−0.020	−0.014
	(0.69)	(1.31)	(0.48)	(0.47)
No denomination	−0.318***	−0.154***	−0.302***	−0.173***
	(11.93)	(3.60)	(9.32)	(4.03)
Religiosity	–	0.073***	–	0.069***
		(7.08)		(8.07)
Age	−0.004	−0.003	0.011	0.011*
	(0.61)	(0.40)	(1.95)	(1.98)
Age²	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000
	(3.47)	(3.03)	(0.64)	(0.44)
Gender (woman)	−0.302***	−0.323***	−0.140***	−0.151***
	(14.54)	(13.49)	(5.34)	(5.65)
Education	−0.185***	−0.190***	−0.121***	−0.124***
	(16.67)	(15.98)	(12.11)	(10.68)
Income	−0.114***	−0.116***	−0.070***	−0.073***
	(8.85)	(8.57)	(6.59)	(6.66)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2 (McFadden)	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.07
Adj. count R^2	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.10
No. of observations	16703	15445	16513	15269

Note: A positive sign indicates an increased likelihood that respondents agree with the statement. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses; *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.10$. Ordered probit regressions with country dummies and country clusters. Country dummies not reported due to space restrictions.

shows. In models 5 and 6, attitudes towards the statement 'Government action for the economy: Support for declining industries to protect jobs?' are examined, while in models 7 and 8, attitudes towards the question 'How important do you personally think job security is in choosing a job?' are examined. Positive coefficients indicate support for extensive job security regulations. Again, Catholics serve as a reference category.

Table 2 presents only weak evidence for a relationship between denomination and preferences for job security regulations. No clear differences between members of different denominations can be detected. Only in models 5 and 6 can we observe a significant negative association between Reformed

Table 2

Religious determinants of job security preferences (ISSP 1996/1997)

	Governmental support for declining industries to protect jobs		Importance of job security as a job characteristic	
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Catholic	Reference category			
Lutheran Protestant	−0.047	−0.039	0.003	−0.023
	(0.89)	(0.82)	(0.04)	(0.30)
Reformed Protestant	−0.080*	−0.084*	−0.084	−0.096
	(1.98)	(2.23)	(1.37)	(1.58)
No denomination	−0.179***	−0.166***	−0.189**	−0.226***
	(5.09)	(6.10)	(3.07)	(3.23)
Religiosity	–	−0.003	–	−0.017
		(0.39)		(1.77)
Age	−0.014*	−0.014*	0.009	0.009
	(2.19)	(2.11)	(1.79)	(1.85)
Age²	0.000	0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	(1.30)	(1.28)	(1.95)	(1.92)
Gender (woman)	0.325***	0.325***	0.049	0.052
	(10.78)	(10.57)	(1.19)	(1.25)
Education	−0.175***	−0.176***	−0.112***	−0.113***
	(13.27)	(13.52)	(4.83)	(4.73)
Income	−0.128***	−0.129***	−0.024	−0.026
	(8.72)	(8.60)	(1.37)	(1.59)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R^2	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.05
Adj. count R^2	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05
No. of observations	12999	12636	14970	14577

Note: A positive sign indicates an increased likelihood that respondents agree with the statement. Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses; *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.10$. Ordered probit regressions with country dummies and country clusters. Country dummies not reported due to space restrictions.

Protestantism and preferences for job security regulations. However, the association is only marginally significant (z-values of 1.98 and 2.23) and not significant in models 7 and 8 using the dependent variable 'Importance of job security as a job characteristic'. This result could be interpreted as support for the hypothesis that Reformed Protestants are particularly critical of state intervention (Heidenheimer 1983; Manow 2002), as discussed earlier. However, these findings are at odds with Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis. As shown in table 1, Reformed Protestants tend to exhibit particularly conservative attitudes with regard to family life organization. Nevertheless, this latter finding should not be over-interpreted, as the association is not very strong. In sum, there is no clear evidence of a relationship between denomination and preferences for job security regulations.

In contrast, a substantive relationship between religiosity and preferences for job security regulations can be observed. Following Glenn (1987), 'no denomination' could be interpreted as a very low level of religiosity. As a consequence, the results in table 2 can be read as evidence that the level of religiosity tends to be strongly associated with support for job security regulations. However, this result should be interpreted with care, since support for job security regulations does not increase with the degree of religiosity. Moreover, respondents who report 'no denomination' are a very heterogeneous group (Lehrer 2004: 721). As a consequence, their attitudes are difficult to evaluate. Some preliminary analyses using ISSP 1996 data show that these respondents are characterized by socially liberal values while they are not generally supportive of social policy interventions. Be that as it may, the social Catholicism thesis claims a relationship between Catholicism and preferences for job security regulations and *not* between the level of religiosity and preferences for job security regulations (Esping-Andersen 1996, 1999). Therefore, I do not consider the evidence presented in table 2 as constituting support for Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis.

Conclusions

Can today's attitudes regarding gender roles and preferences for job security regulations explain differences in female employment rates, as famously argued by Esping-Andersen (1996, 1999)? In this article, I argue that they cannot. While Catholics, Reformed Protestants and people with a religious faith in general favour more conservative family models, no clear association with preferences for job security regulations can be observed. Respondents of no religious denomination seem to be rather critical of job security regulations. However, considering the heterogeneous composition of this group, this result is difficult to interpret. Moreover, the indicator of the level of religiosity (church attendance) is not associated with preferences for job security regulations. Finally, Reformed Protestants seem to be rather critical of state intervention. This critical attitude can be explained by their anti-statist orientation (Heidenheimer 1983; Manow 2002), but it is at odds with the proclaimed relationship between familialist values and preferences for job security regulations (Esping-Andersen 1996; Algan and Cahuc 2006). Thus, Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism cannot explain cross-country differences in female employment rates.

This conclusion leaves us with a puzzle. If Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis is flawed, how can we explain the positive correlation between Catholicism and job security regulations, on the one hand, and the positive correlation between Catholicism and female employment rates, on the other (see Schmidt 1993; Feldmann 2007; Emmenegger 2008)? First, the negative relationship between Catholicism and female employment rates can be explained by attitudes about the intrinsic value of work. As argued by Feldmann (2007: 809), societies that were historically shaped by once powerful Protestant institutions developed a national culture that included the value of hard and diligent work (Landes 1998). As a consequence, higher female labour force participation rates can be expected in Protestant countries. Unlike

Esping-Andersen's social Catholicism thesis, such an explanation would not be falsified by the finding that Reformed Protestants are just as supportive of conservative family organization models as Catholics.

Second, the absence of a relationship between denomination and preferences for job security regulations at the micro level does not inevitably rule out a possible relationship between religion and job security regulations (see Emmenegger 2008, 2009b). However, in this case, the influence of Catholicism may be rather a reflection of a particular style of state–society relations than of familialist values. In predominantly Catholic countries, the Catholic Church challenged the legitimacy of the modernizing state. This antagonism to the state contrasted with the predominantly Lutheran or Reformed Protestant countries (Badie and Birnbaum 1983; Kaufmann 1988; Crouch 1993; Sørensen 1998; Manow 2002; Ertman 2009). As a reaction to the Catholic challenge, the young Catholic states have built up a comprehensive administration, and a tight network of regulations, and have tried to fill the political space (Crouch 1986, 1993). Thus, somewhat ironically, the rejection of the modern state by the Catholic Church led to the emergence of strong and authoritarian central states, as was the case in France under the Second Empire or in Fascist Italy, that tried to take over as many responsibilities as possible (Badie and Birnbaum 1983: 88–9), not least in the area of social policy (Bonoli 2003).

This conclusion echoes Robert Bates's advice not to 'confound the analysis of the role of institutions with the theory of their causes' (Bates 1988: 387). Esping-Andersen's argument implies that political actors who supported the introduction of job security regulations were aware of the gendered consequences. However, it is questionable whether political actors could have foreseen these consequences (Streeck 1997; Pierson 2004). Thus, if we want to know more about the relationship between religion and job security regulations, we should follow Pierson (2000: 264) and 'go back and look'.

Appendix

Table A1

Classification of religious denominations

Catholics	Roman Catholic
Lutheran Protestants	German Evangelical Church, Norwegian State Church, Church of Sweden, and Danish State Church
Reformed Protestants	Baptists, Methodists, Presbyterians/Church of Scotland, Church of England, Church of Ireland, Anglican, URS/Congregational, Episcopal, Unitarians, Uniting Church, Free Church, Swiss Reformed Church, United Church, Free Presbyterian, Pentecostal, Mormon, Salvation Army/Assemblies of God, Seventh Day Adventists.

Table A2

Variable descriptions

		ISSP 1996		ISSP 1997		ISSP 1998	
		Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
A husband's job is to earn money; a wife's job is to look after home and family (1 to 5).		–	–	–	–	2.48	1.34
All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job (1 to 5).		–	–	–	–	2.92	1.33
Government action for the economy: Support for declining industries to protect jobs? (1 to 5).		3.61	1.14	–	–	–	–
How important do you personally think each item is in a job: job security? (1 to 5).		–	–	4.47	0.71	–	–
Catholic	Dummy variable, see table A1.	0.37	0.48	0.37	0.48	0.42	0.49
Lutheran Protestant	Dummy variable, see table A1.	0.22	0.41	0.23	0.42	0.18	0.38
Reformed Protestant	Dummy variable, see table A1.	0.19	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.15	0.36
No denomination	Dummy variable.	0.22	0.41	0.22	0.41	0.26	0.44
Religiosity	How often do you attend religious services? (1 to 6)	2.73	1.77	2.66	1.73	2.94	1.84
Gender	Dummy = 1 for female respondents.	0.51	0.50	0.53	0.50	0.53	0.50
Age	Respondent's age.	45.60	16.50	44.70	16.40	46.20	17.30
Education	Highest attained education degree (1 to 7).	4.62	1.43	4.64	1.45	4.57	1.43
Income	Household income, z-standardized per country, subsequently pooled.	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.06	1.00

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Notes

1. Papal encyclicals are available online at: http://www.papalencyclicals.net (accessed 18 October 2007).
2. The situation is similar for the predictions of the social Catholicism thesis in the areas of early child care and education. As Morgan (2002) shows, the social Catholicism thesis can neither explain the high level of childcare provision in publicly funded services in Belgium, France and Italy, nor the historical development of childcare services in France, Germany and Sweden. Similarly, the social Catholicism thesis cannot explain cross-national differences in educational provisions. In a discussion of Northern European education policies, Eide (1992: 9) argues that the comparatively high school entrance age in Northern Europe is the result of a 'commonly held view that the upbringing of children is primarily a family affair'.
3. There is considerable evidence in the literature on the negative relationship between job security regulations and female employment rates (Esping-Andersen 2000; OECD 2004). The relationship between the share of Catholics in a nation state and the strictness of job security regulations is more controversial (Saint-Paul 1996; Bonoli 2003; Huo *et al.* 2008; Emmenegger 2008, 2009b).
4. Data taken from Penn World Table 6.2. Available at: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu (accessed 22 May 2007).
5. These countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.
6. ISSP 1998 incorporates 17 countries relevant to this article: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. ISSP 1997 covers 14 countries of interest: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. ISSP 1996 incorporates 11 countries of interest: Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States.
7. However, note that the usage of World Value Survey wave 2000 leads to similar conclusions. Therefore, the presented results are not dependent on the selection of surveys.
8. The usage of alternative operationalizations of the level of religiosity (belief in God, frequency of personal prayer) in ISSP 1998 leads to identical conclusions. Alternative operationalizations are not available in ISSP 1996 and 1997. However, a replication of the statistical analysis presented here using World Value Survey wave 2000 shows that the findings are not dependent on the selection of the indicator of the level of religiosity.
9. One important qualification is necessary. Denomination may be systematically correlated with religiosity. This is indeed the case. Lutheran Protestants have a lower attendance rate than Reformed Protestants and Catholics. In contrast, people raised in a Reformed Protestant denomination tend to abandon their

denomination more frequently than do Lutheran Protestants and Catholics. This could mean that voters in predominantly Catholic countries still demand more conservative policies, since the overall share of religious people is higher.

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