Patrick Emmenegger

I will be teaching at two summer schools this year. In July/August I will teach QCA and fuzzy sets at the ECPR Summer School in Methods and Techniques in Ljubljana and in August I will talk about welfare state development at the NordWel and REASSESS International Summer School in Reykjavik. For more information, please consult the websites of ECPR and NordWel.

The Journal of European Social Policy just accepted the manuscript “Immigration and Redistribution Revisited: How Different Motivations Can Offset Each Other” (co-authored with Robert Klemmensen). Here is the abstract:

Despite compelling theoretical arguments, existing research has so far failed to provide conclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigration. We argue that social scientists risk making erroneous inferences if the causal link connecting an independent variable to a given output is not carefully modelled. This is particularly true in the presence of multiple and partly offsetting intervening variables. We argue that there are at least four motivations linking attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. We observe a statistically significant association between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration, but only after the motivations have been explicitly integrated into the empirical analysis. If the motivations are not explicitly modelled, no systematic relationship between attitudes towards redistribution and preferred levels of immigration can be observed.

Political Research Quarterly just accepted the article “Making the Most of Configurational Comparative Analysis: An Assessment of QCA Applications in Comparative Welfare State Research” as part of a symposium on Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Here is the abstract:

“The capacity of QCA to align with complex theoretical expectations and configurational relationships is rarely used to the full. To make the most of QCA we emphasize in line with guidelines on best-practice the importance of expressing (complex) theoretical expectations in set-theoretical terms, going back to the cases when interpreting the formal results, and carrying out robustness tests. In this assessment of comparative welfare state research using QCA, however, we find that only half of the studies made complex propositions formulated in set-theoretical terms. Moreover, despite the case-oriented nature of QCA, only few scholars went back to the cases after the formal analysis. Finally, not all studies carried out robustness checks of their findings. We argue that improvements on these issues can increase the quality of QCA applications.”

I am looking for two doctoral students / research assistants (50%). The successful candidates will engage in research and teaching at the Chair of Comparative Political Economy and Public Policy at the Department of Political Science, University of St. Gallen, and will be expected to pursue a doctoral project in the PhD programme in International Affairs and Political Economy.

Applicants are expected to hold an MA in political science (or related disciplines) with distinction and demonstrate a strong motivation to pursue an academic career. The position presupposes an interest in theory-driven empirical research and good knowledge of social science research methods. A good command of English, both spoken and written, is expected. Further language skills are an advantage. The position starts in November 2012 (or upon agreement) and is for a period of up to five years.

Scandinavian Political Studies has just accepted the article “Strategic Re-Framing as a Vote Winner: Why Vote-Seeking Governments Pursue Unpopular Reforms” (co-authored with Christian Elmelund-Præstekær) for publication. Here is the abstract:

Most political science accounts assume that governments in Western democracies avoid unpopular reforms to protect their re-election chances. Nevertheless, governments sometimes embark on electorally risky reforms – even in times when they have no slack in the polls. We argue that pursuing unpopular reforms can be a perfectly rational strategy for vote-seeking governments. Based on a simple game theoretical model that compares strategic framing with the classic blame avoidance strategy, we demonstrate that unpopular policy reforms allow governments to pursue gains of both policy and votes by opting for a highly visible strategy of reframing the substantive reform issue in question. We illustrate this general argument with the substantial 2011 retrenchment of Danish early retirement benefits. This particular welfare state programme was highly popular. Nevertheless, the incumbent liberal prime minister proposed to abolish it only few months prior to a national election while his government was trailing significantly in the polls.

The European Journal of Political Research just accepted the manuscript “Defending the Organisation, Not the Members: Unions and the Reform of Job Security Legislation in Western Europe” (co-authored with Johan Bo Davidsson from Lund University) for publication. Here is the abstract:

“European labour markets are often described as rigid with comparatively high levels of job protection that do not allow for the flexible adjustment of employment to economic fluctuations. This interpretation overlooks important sources of flexibility, however. Research has shown that recent labour market policy reforms have allowed for the creation of two-tier labour markets consisting of insiders in standard employment relationships and outsiders in non-standard employment. This outcome has typically been explained by pointing to the representational interests of unions or social-democratic parties. It has been argued that rather than protecting all labour market participants, unions and social-democratic parties focus on the interests of their members and their core constituency respectively, most of whom are in standard employment relationships. In contrast, we argue that unions’ institutional power resources are the crucial variable explaining this outcome. In difficult economic times, when unions are asked to make concessions, they will assent to labour market reforms, but only to reforms that do not fundamentally threaten to undermine their organisational interests. In the context of job security legislation, this means that unions defend the protection of permanent contracts, while they compromise on the regulation of temporary employment. This ‘second best solution’ allows them to protect their organisational interests both by retaining their institutional role in the administration of dismissals and by living up to their institutional role as one of the organisations responsible for the direction of labour market policy reform. Using fsQCA we show that unions’ institutional power resources are more apt to explain the observed two-tier reform pattern than the unions’ or the social-democratic parties’ representational interests.”

A new manuscript has just appeared in Comparative Political Studies (co-authored with Romana Careja, University of Cologne). It analyzes the effects of migration experience on political attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe. Here is the abstract:

Making Democratic Citizens: The Effects of Migration Experience on Political Attitudes in Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines the effects of migration experience on political attitudes in Central and Eastern European countries.The rationale for this quest is the hypothesis that contact with democratic contexts translates into democratic political attitudes, for which evidence is so far inconclusive. In this article, we are interested to see whether migrants returning from Western countries display different political attitudes than their fellow nonmigrant citizens.The analysis of survey data shows that migration experience diversifies the array of political attitudes: Although migrants are more likely to trust EU institu- tions and to try to convince friends in political discussions, they do not differ from nonmigrants in their attitudes toward domestic institutions. Based on earlier works on determinants of political attitudes, the authors argue that migration experience has a significant effect only when these attitudes are related to objects that are associated with improvements in the migrants’ material and cognitive status.

For the full article, please go to the website of Comparative Political Studies.

The Journal of Comparative Politics has recently accepted the manuscript “What Motivates You? The Relationship between Preferences for Redistribution and Attitudes towards Immigration” (co-authored with Robert Klemmensen) for publication. Here is the abstract:

The tension between immigration and redistribution has attracted increased attention in recent years. Many authors argue, based on economic self-interest theory, that there is a negative relationship between support for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. Although we acknowledge the role of economic self-interest, we argue that there is in fact a multitude of motivations that moderate the relationship between preferences for redistribution and attitudes towards immigration. Extending a model of preferences for immigration, we show empirically that self-interested and strongly reciprocal individuals experience a tension between immigration and redistribution, while egalitarians do not experience this tension. Humanitarians express a general willingness to help those who are worse off, immigrants included, but this motivation does not affect their preferences for redistribution.

Oxford University Press just published the book “The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies” (co-edited with Silja Häusermann, Bruno Palier and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser). Please find more information about the book on the OUP website.